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WORKER'S COMPENSATION-LONGSHOREMEN AND HARBOR WORKERS'
COMPENSATION ACT-FEDERAL EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY ACT-The
United States Supreme Court held that railroad employee's who
are injured while performing maintenance tasks on equipment es-
sential to the process of loading or unloading a ship are covered for
injuries under the provisions of the Longshoremen and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act.
Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Co. v Schwalb, -US -, 110
S Ct 381 (1989).
The three respondents involved in this case, Nancy J. Schwalb,
William McGlone and Robert Goode, each brought separate ac-
tions in the Virginia trial courts seeking compensation for injuries
suffered while in the employ of the respective railroads, petitioners
herein.' Respondents Nancy J. Schwalb and William McGlone
were employed as laborers for the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway
Company.2 The respondents were employed to perform housekeep-
ing and janitorial services in the offices, shops, bathrooms, and
other places situated on the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Com-
pany's pier and adjacent property in Newport News, Virginia. The
railroad maintained facilities on its property designed to transfer
coal from railroad cars to ships moored at the pier." As part of the
duties assigned by the petitioner, the respondents were required to
1. Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company v Schwalb, - US - 110 S Ct 381
(1989).
2. Scwalb, 110 S Ct at 383.
3. Schwalb v Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, 235 Va 27, 365 SE2d 742
(1988).
4. Schwalb, 365 SE2d at 743. In the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway yards, a
"dumper" activated by "trunion rollers" upends railroad cars and dumps coal into "hop-
pers." Id. The coal falls from the hoppers onto conveyor belts that carry it to a "loading
tower" from which it is poured into the hold of a ship. Id. It is impossible to precisely define
the term "pier" as that term is used for purposes of coverage under the Longshoreman and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (hereinafter, "LHWCA"). It is relevant to note, how-
ever, that both Congress and the courts have given the term a broad meaning. See E. Jhirad,
1A Benedict on Admiralty § 16B (Times Mirror Books, 7th ed 1977 & Supp). See also, note
134 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "situs" requirements under the LHWCA.
Under the present statute, a pier or dock may be floating in the water or secured on land, or
even extend a number of miles inland. Jhirad, 1A Benedict § 16B (cited in this note above).
A particular situs will be covered under the LHWCA if it is customarily used by an em-
ployer in "loading, unloading, repairing, dismantling or building a vessel." Id.
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clean spilled coal away from these areas.' William McGlone se-
verely injured his right arm as he cleaned coal from underneath a
conveyor belt.6 Nancy J. Schwalb suffered head injuries when she
fell while walking along a "cat walk" while on her way to clear the
equipment.
7
Respondent Robert Goode was a pier machinist at petitioner,
Norfolk and Western Railway Company's terminal in Norfolk, Vir-
ginia.' Goode's primary job was to maintain and repair loading
equipment, including the dumpers and conveyor belts in the Nor-
folk and Western railway yard.9 Goode injured his hand while re-
pairing a retarder on one of Norfolk and Western's dumpers."0 The
loading of the ship was stopped for several hours while Goode
made the repairs."
The three respondents sought relief in the Virginia trial courts
under the Federal Employer's Liability Act (hereinafter
"FELA").1 2 In each case the railway companies challenged the trial
5. Scwalb, 365 SE2d at 743. The Supreme Court of Virginia noted that coal falling
and accumulating beneath the conveyor belts could damage the belts and interrupt the
loading process. Id.
6. Schwalb, 110 S Ct at 383.
7. Id. Each of the respondents were injured in separate accidents. Schwalb's acci-
dent occurred on January 11, 1983. McGlone was injured on February 1, 1983. Brief filed on
the merits for Petitioners, Schwalb and McGlone.
8. Schwalb, 110 S Ct at 383.
9. Id. At the Norfolk and Western Terminal, a loaded coal car is moved to a dumper
which turns the coal car upside down. The coal car is locked into place by a mechanical
device called a "retarder." The coal then falls onto conveyor belts and is delivered to the
ship via a loader. Id.
10. Id. Goode suffered his injury on February 11, 1985. Brief filed on the merits for
Petitioner, Goode.
11. Schwalb, 110 S Ct at 383. The Supreme Court cites this fact to support the con-
clusion that the work Goode was performing was an essential element of the loading and
unloading process bringing him within the coverage of the LHWCA. Id at 386.
12. Schwalb, 365 SE2d at 742. Section 51 of the Federal Employer's Liability Act sets
forth a negligence cause of action for employees injured while in the employ of a common
carrier. 45 USC § 51 (West 1982).
Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of the
several States or Territories, or between any of the States and Territories, or between
the District of Columbia and any of the States or Territories, or between the District
of Columbia or any of the States or Territories and any foreign nation or nations,
shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such
carrier in such commerce, or, in case of the death of such employee, to his or her
personal representative, for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and chil-
dren of such employee; and, if none, then of such employee's parents; and, if none,
then of the next of kin dependent upon such employee, for such injury or death re-
sulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or em-
ployees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negli-
gence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats,
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court's jurisdiction by claiming that the Longshoremen and Harbor
Worker's Compensation Act (hereinafter "LHWCA") provided the
exclusive remedy.'3 All three trial courts agreed with the railroads
and dismissed the actions." The injured employees appealed.' 6
The Supreme Court of Virginia consolidated the appeals of
Schwalb and McGlone and reversed the decisions of the trial
courts.'" The Supreme Court of Virginia, relying on its earlier deci-
sion in White v Norfolk & Western R. Co., 7 focused upon the is-
wharves, or other equipment.
Any employee of a carrier, any part of whose duties as such employee shall be the
furtherance of interstate or foreign commerce; or shall, in any way directly or closely
and substantially, affect such commerce as above set forth shall, for the purposes of
this Act be considered as being employed by such carrier in such commerce and shall
be considered as entitled to the benefits of this Act and of an Act entitled "An Act
relating to the liability of common carriers by railroad to their employees in certain
cases."
45 USC §§ 51-60 (West 1982).
13. Schwalb, 110 S Ct at 383. Section 905(a) of the LHWCA states:
(a) The liability of an employer prescribed in section 4 [33 USCS § 904] shall be
exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee, his legal
representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone other-
wise entitled to recover damages from such employer at law or in admiralty on ac-
count of such injury or death, except that if an employer fails to secure payment of
compensation as required by this Act, an injured employee, or his legal representative
in case death results from the injury, may elect to claim compensation under the Act,
or to maintain an action at law or in admiralty for damages on account of such injury
or death. In such action the defendant may not plead as a defense that the injury was
caused by the negligence of a fellow servant, or that the employee assumed the risk of
his employment, or that the injury was due to the contributory negligence of the
employee.
33 USC § 905(a) (West 1982).
14. Schwalb, 110 S Ct at 383. The actions were dismissed for failure to state a cause
of action under the FELA. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the trial court and
remanded the Schwalb and McGlone cases for a complete trial on the merits. Schwalb, 365
SE2d at 745-46.
15. Id. If an employee's injuries are covered by the Longshoremen and Harbor Work-
ers' Compensation Act, the remedy provided by that Act is exclusive; an action may not be
brought under the Federal Employer's Liability Act, which provides a negligence cause of
action for railroad employees. Schwalb, 110 S Ct at 383. See note 12 for the relevant lan-
guage of FELA.
16. Schwalb, 365 SE2d at 745. For disposition of Goode's appeal, see note 22 and
accompanying text.
17. 217 Va 823, 232 SE2d 807 (1977). In White, the Supreme Court of Virginia de-
nied benefits under the LHWCA to an employee who suffered permanent hearing loss as a
result of exposure to excessive noise levels while repairing electrical equipment at Norfolk
and Western's Lambert's Point terminal in Norfolk, Va. White, 232 SE2d at 808, 813. Al-
though the injury occurred upon "navigable waters of the United States" within the mean-
ing of the Act, an employee who did not actually handle any cargo either manually or
mechanically, and did not manipulate the controls of the electrical mechanism which fur-
nished power for the automated loading process, was not a person engaged in "maritime
employment" under the meaning of the Act. Id. Such an employee was at least one step
Duquesne Law Review
sue of whether the employee's activities had a "realistically signifi-
cant" relationship to the loading process."8 The applicability of the
LHWCA was limited to the "essential elements" of loading and
unloading. 1' The Supreme Court of Virginia concluded: "The 'es-
sential elements' standard is more nearly akin to the significant
relationship standard we adopted in White."20 The court held that
those performing maintenance tasks should be treated identical to
those performing clerical tasks and thus would not be covered by
the LHWCA. 1 In a later unpublished opinion, the Virginia court
reversed the Goode appeal based upon its decision in Schwalb. 
2
Because this decision by the Supreme Court of Virginia differed
from those federal courts of appeal which have addressed the is-
sue,"3 the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.24
According to the United States Supreme Court, for an employee
to be covered by LHWCA, he must meet four conditions. First, the
injured person must be injured in the course of his employment.
25
Second, the employer must have employees who are employed in
maritime employment.' Third, the injury must occur "upon the
navigable waters of the United States (including any adjoining
pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or
other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in loading,
removed from a realistically significant relationship and from a direct involvement with
the loading process. Id (emphasis added).
18. Schwalb, 365 SE2d at 744 (1988).
19. Id at 745.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Schwalb, 110 S Ct at 384.
23. See for example, Harmon v Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 741 F2d 1398, 1403-04 (D C
Cir 1984); SeaLand Services, Inc. v Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs,
685 F2d 1121, 1123 (9th Cir 1982) (per curiam); Hullinghorst Industries, Inc. v Carroll, 650
F2d 750, 755-56 (5th Cir 1981); Garvey Grain Co. v Director, Office of Workers' Compensa-
tion Programs, 639 F2d 366, 370 (7th Cir 1981) (per curiam); Prolerized New England Co. v
Benefits Review Board, 637 F2d 30, 37 (1st Cir 1980).
24. Schwalb, 110 S Ct at 384.
25. Id. The term "injury" means accidental injury or death arising out of and in the
course of employment, and such occupational disease or infection as arises naturally out of
such employment or as naturally or unavoidably results from such accidental injury, and
includes an injury caused by the willful act of a third person directed against an employee
because of his employment. 33 USC § 902(2)( West 1982 & Supp).
26. Schwalb, 110 S Ct at 384. The term "employer" means an employer any of whose
employees are employed in maritime employment, in whole or in part, upon the navigable
waters of the United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, build-
ing way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in loading,
unloading, repairing, or building a vessel). 33 USC § 902(4) (West 1982 & Supp).
Vol. 29:417
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unloading, repairing, dismantling, or building a vessel). Fourth,
the employee who is injured within that area must be a person en-
gaged in maritime employment, including any longshoreman or
other person engaged in longshoring operations, or any harbor-
worker, including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, or ship-breaker. 28
27. Schwalb, 110 S Ct at 384. Section 903 provides in relevant part:
§ 903 Coverage
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, compensation shall be payable under
this Act in respect of disability or death of an employee, but only if the disability or
death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States
(including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine rail-
way, or other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading,
repairing, dismantling, or building a vessel).
(b) No compensation shall be payable in respect of the disability or death of an of-
ficer or employee of the Unites States, or any agency thereof, or of any State or for-
eign government, or any subdivision thereof.
(c) No compensation shall be payable if the injury was occasioned solely by the intox-
ication of the employee to injure or kill himself or another.
(d)(l) No compensation shall be payable to an employee employed at a facility of an
employer if, as certified by the Secretary, the facility is engaged in the business of
building, repairing, or dismantling exclusively small vessels (as defined in paragraph
(3) of this subsection), unless the injury occurs while upon the navigable waters of the
United States or while upon any adjoining pier, wharf, dock, facility over land for
launching vessels, or facility over land for hauling, lifting, or drydocking vessels.
(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), compensation shall be payable to an employee-
(A) who is employed at a facility which is used in the business of building,
repairing or dismantling small vessles if such facility receives Federal maritime
subsidies; or
(B) if the employee is not subject to coverage under a State workers' compen-
saion law.
(3) For purposes of this subsection, a small vessel means-
(A) a commercial barge which is under 900 lightship displacement tons; or
(B) a commercial tugboat, towboat, crew boat, supply boat, fishing vessel, or
other work vessel which is under 1,600 tons gross.
(e) Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, any amounts paid to an employee
for the same injury, disability, or death for which benefits are claimed under this Act
pursuant to any other workers' compensation law or section 20 of the Act of March 4,
1915 (38 Stat. 1185, chapter 153; 46 U.S.C. 688) [46 USCS Appx § 6881 (relating to
recovery for injury to or death of seamen) shall be credited against any liability im-
posed by this Act.
33 USC § 903 (West 1982 & Supp).
28. Schwalb, 110 S Ct at 384. The term "employee" means any person engaged in
maritime employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring
operations, and any harborworker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and shipbreaker,
but such term does not include-
(A) individuals employed exclusively to perform office clerical, secretarial, security, or
data processing work;
(B) individuals employed by a club, camp, recreational operation, restaurant, mu-
seum, or retail outlet;
(C) individuals employed by a marina and who are not engaged in construction, re-
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The issue in the instant case was whether the employees were
engaged in maritime employment within the meaning of the
LHWCA.1e It has clearly been decided that land-based activity will
be deemed maritime employment only if it is an integral or essen-
tial part of the loading or unloading process.30 In the case before
the Court, the three respondents were connected with the loading
process only by way of the maintenance and repair work they were
performing.3 ' The respondents would be covered by the LHWCA
only if these tasks were maritime employment.
3 2
The Supreme Court said: "Employees who are injured while
maintaining or repairing equipment essential to the loading or un-
loading process are covered by The Act. Such employees are en-
gaged in activity that is an integral part of and essential to those
overall processes."3 3 A person who repairs or maintains loading
equipment is just as much an integral part of the loading process
as the operator of the equipment.3 ' When machinery was broken or
clogged due to lack of cleaning, the loading process was tempora-
rily stopped. 5 It was irrelevant that an employee's contribution to
the loading process was not continuous or that repair or mainte-
nance was not always needed.3 Finding that the repair and main-
tenance of the loading equipment was integral to the loading pro-
cess, the Court found that the employees were covered by the
placement, or expansion of such marina (except for routine maintenance);
(D) individuals who () are employed by suppliers, transporters, or vendors, (ii) are
temporarily doing business on the premises of an employer described in paragraph
(4), and (iii) are not engaged in work normally performed by employees of that em-
ployer under this Act;
(E) acquaculture workers;
(F) individuals employed to build, repair, or dismantle any recreational vessel under
sixty-five feet in length;
(G) a master or member of a crew of any vessel; or
(H) any person engaged by a maser to load or unload or repair any small vessel under
eighteen tons net;
if individuals described in clauses (A) through (F) are subject to coverage under a
State workers' compensation law.
33 USC § 902(3) (West 1982 & Supp).
29. Schwalb, 110 S Ct at 384. The issue in the present case addressed the fourth part
of the test set forth by the Court. Id.
30. See for example, Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v Caputo, 432 US 249 (1977);
P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v Ford, 444 US 69 (1979).
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The Supreme Court of Virginia was incorrect when it held that
the repair and maintenance of equipment, essential to the loading
process, was not maritime employment.38  It made no difference
whether the particular kind of repair the employee was performing
could be considered traditional railroad work or might be per-
formed by railroad employees wherever railroad cars were un-
loaded.3' Similarly, equipment cleaning that is necessary to keep
the machines operative is a form of maintenance and is only differ-
ent in degree from repair work.' 0 The majority thus held that em-
ployees who are injured on the situs while performing these essen-
tial functions are covered by the LHWCA, and for this reason, the
Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the Supreme Court of
Virginia."
In a separate concurring opinion,' 2Justice Blackmun, with whom
Justice Marshall and Justice O'Connor joined, emphasized that the
Court's decision in no way repudiated the "amphibious workers'"
3
doctrine as announced in Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v
Caputo." Blackmun explained that the 1972 amendments to the
LHWCA were designed to solve the problem of employees walking
in and out of coverage of the Act throughout the course of the day
if they performed some tasks over water and other tasks over
land."' Thus, Blackmun construed the Act as applying regardless
37. Id. Although the Supreme Court of the United States has never addressed the
issue, a number of circuit courts have held that those injured while maintaining or repairing
loading equipment are covered by the LHWCA. Id at 385, 384. See note 23 for a list of these
cases. See also, Jhirad, 1A Benedict § 16e (cited in note 4) for an exhaustive list of occupa-
tions covered by the LHWCA.
38. Schwalb, 110 S Ct at 386.
39. Id.
40. Id. As stated above, Schwalb and McGlone were both injured while performing
janitorial tasks. See note 4 and accompanying text.
41. Id.
42. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy joined in the major-
ity opinion. Justice Blackmun filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Marshall and Jus-
tice O'Connor joined. Justice Stevens filed a separate concurring opinion. Id at 382.
43. For a discussion of the "amphibious workers" doctrine, see note 161 and accom-
panying text.
44. 432 US 249 (1977).
45. Schwalb, 110 S Ct at 386. The Court said: "Congress wanted to provide continu-
ous coverage throughout their employment to these amphibious workers who, without the
1972 Amendments, would be covered only for part of their activity. It seems clear, therefore,
that when Congress said it wanted to cover 'longshore-men,' it had in mind persons whose
employment is such that they spend at least some of their time in indisputably longshoring
operations and who, without the 1972 Amendments, would be covered for only part of their
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of the particular activity the employee was engaged in at the time
of the injury.
The respondents in Schwalb were injured while performing tasks
essential to the process of loading a ship.46 Blackmun opined: "It is
not essential to our holding that the employees were injured while
actually engaged in these tasks. They are covered by the LHWCA
even if, at the moment of injury, they had been performing other
work that was not essential to the loading process.
'4 7
The concurring Justices cited P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v Ford, s stating
that the 'crucial factor' in determining whether coverage under the
Act applied was the "nature of the activity to which a worker may
be assigned."'4e To claim that the respondents in this case were
covered only if they were injured while performing maintenance on
an element of the loading process would bring the "walking in and
out of coverage" problem back with a vengeance5 0 Blackmun em-
phisized that the majority's holding would not revitalize the shift-
ing and fortuitous coverage that Congress intended to eliminate by
enacting the 1972 amendments.51
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Stevens stated his view
that application of the LHWCA is limited to only those workers
who are directly involved in moving freight onto and off ships, or
in building, repairing, and destroying ships, as the Supreme Court
of Virginia adopted in White v Norfolk and Western Railway
Company.s2 However, because of the uniform and consistent
course of decision by the various courts of appeals that have ad-
dressed the issue,5 a reasonable rule of law has been established
which he felt bound to respect.5
4
The history of the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act has been recited many times.5 The LHWCA has a
activity." Id. Under this "Amphibious Workers" doctrine compensation is provided regard-
less of whether the injury occurs over land or water. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 444 US 69 (1979).
49. Schwalb, 110 S Ct at 387 (emphasis in original).
50. Id.
51. Id (quoting Northeast Marine Terminal Company v Caputo, 432 US 249 (1977)).
52. Schwalb, 110 S Ct at 387. White v Norfolk & Western Railway Comany, 217 Va
823, 232 SE2d 807 (1977).
53. For examples, see note 23.
54. Schwalb, 110 S Ct at 387.
55. See for example, E. Jhirad, 1A Benedict §§ 1-14 (cited in note 4), Arthur Larson,
4 The Law of Workmen's Compensation §§ 89.21-89.27 (Commerce Clearing House 1977);
G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty §§ 6-45 to 6-49 (Foundation Press, 2d ed
424 Vol. 29:417
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long and illustrious history with roots which extend into the previ-
ous century." It has been said that those involved in Maritime em-
ployment can be divided into two categories: members of the crew
of a vessel generally referred to as seamen, and local waterfront
workers who perform a variety of ship-to-shore duties. 7 Whereas
injured members of the former group have been entitled to the
traditional seaman's remedies of maintenance and cure, members
of the latter group have enjoyed no such benefit."
Before passage of workers' compensation acts, longshoremen and
harbor workers, like injured employees generally, were forced to
bring negligence actions against their employers."9 In proving a
negligence action against the employer, injured longshoremen and
harbor workers had to prove the basic elements of negligence, as
well as overcome a trio of defenses: assumption of the risk, contrib-
utory negligence and the fellow servant rule." In the early 1900's
many states passed worker's compensation laws.' Although these
state laws were not directly applicable to maritime workers, many
maritime employers voluntarily complied with the local state
laws. 2 This voluntary compliance came to an end, however, after
the United States Supreme Court held in Southern Pacific Com-
pany v Jensen,8 that New York's workers' compensation law was
unconstitutional in regard to its coverage of longshoremen and
other harbor workers."
1975); Note, Longshoremen, Longahoring Operations, and Maritime Employment: A Dual
Test of Status After Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v Caputo, 64 Va L Rev 99, (1978);
Note, Fixing the Landward Coverage of the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 36 Md L Rev 851 (1977); Note, The Docking of the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act: How Far Can It Come Ashore?,
29 U of Fla L Rev 681 (1977). For other references, see Note, Longshoremen, Longahoring
Operation, and Maritime Employment: A Dual Test of Status After Northeast Marine
Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 64 Va L Rev 99, 101, n.14 (1978).
56. The Longshoremen and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act is a result of the
inapplicability of state workers' compensation laws to those injured in longshoring opera-
tions. The first workers' compensation law was passed in England in 1897. Jhirad, 1A Bene-
dict § 2 (cited in note 4).
57. Jhirad, 1A Benedict § 1 (cited in note 4).
58. Id. See the Jones Act, 46 USC § 688 (West 1986) for remedies provided to injured
seaman.
59. Jhirad, 1A Benedict § 1 (cited in note 4). Forcing an injured employee to bring a





63. 244 US 205 (1917).
64. Jensen, 244 US at 218.
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In Jensen, the employee was fatally injured when he was operat-
ing an electric truck while attempting to unload cargo from the
hold of the ship." Jensen died after he struck his head against the
entrance way to the ship.66 Jensen's surviving family members at-
tempted to collect under the New York workers' compensation law,
but the railroad claimed that the employee was provided an exclu-
sive remedy under the FELA. 7
The Supreme Court held that the New York statute did not ap-
ply because its application would directly conflict with the uniform
operation of maritime law."8 Under Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution, which extends the judicial power of the United
States "to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," 69 and
Article 1, Section 8, which gives Congress the power to pass all
laws which are necessary and proper for executing the powers
vested in the general government or in any of its departments or
officers, Congress has the paramount power to fix and determine
the maritime law which shall prevail throughout the country.
70
The power of the states to change, modify or affect the general
maritime law, while existing to some extent under the Constitution
and the Judiciary Act of 1789,' may not contravene the essential
purposes of an act of Congress, work material prejudice to the
characteristic features of the general maritime law or interfere with
the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international
and interstate relations.7 ' Although the district courts of the
65. Id at 208.
66. Id.
67. Id at 209-10. See note 12 for the relevant language of FELA.
68. Jensen, 244 US at 215. The Jensen Court cited Mr. Justice Bradley speaking for
the Court in The Lottawanna, 21 Wall 558: "The general system of maritime law which was
familiar to the lawyers and statesmen of the country when the Constitution was adopted,
was most certainly intended and referred to when it was declared in that instrument that
the judicial power of the United States shall extend 'to all cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction'. . . One thing, however, is unquestionable; the Constitution must have referred
to a system of law coextensive with, and operating uniformly in, the whole country. Id.
69. Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution states: "The judicial
power shall extend to.. .all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction..." US Const,
Art III, § 2.
70. Jensen, 244 US at 214. Article I, Section 8, of the United States Constitution
states: "That Congress shall have power... [T]o make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof." US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 18.
71. See section 9: Judicial Code Sections 24 and 256.
72. Jensen, 244 US at 216. The Court states: "By Section 9, Judiciary Act of 1789, 1
Stat 76, 77, the District Courts of the United States were given 'exclusive original cogni-
zance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; ... saving to suitors, in all
426 Vol. 29:417
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United States have been given exclusive admiralty jurisdiction by
the Judiciary Act, a plaintiff could maintain an admiralty action in
a state court by means of the "saving to suitors" clause where the
common law was competent to give a remedy.7' The Supreme
Court held, however, that the remedy available under the New
York workers' compensation law was a remedy unknown to the
common law and was incapable of enforcement by the ordinary
processes of any court'.7 Therefore, this remedy was not among the
common-law remedies which were saved to suitors under section 9
of the Judiciary Act of 1789. '
The practical effect of the Jensen decision was to fix the appli-
cability of state workers compensation laws at the waters edge.7 6
This "waters edge" boundary later became known as the "Jensen
Line."'77 While over land, an injured employee was covered by a
state's workmen's compensation law. 78 Once over the water, how-
ever, his only remedies were under the federal law.79
Congress ignored the Court's call for uniform maritime law. By
an act passed on the 6th of October, 1917, Congress again at-
tempted to amend the "saving to suitors" clause by adding the
words "and [saving] to claimants the rights and remedies under
the Worker's Compensation Law of any State."80 This amended
act was quickly tested in the case of Knickerbocker Die Co v Stew-
art,8' where the Supreme Court held the amendment wholly un-
constitutional on the grounds that Congress may not delegate to
the states legislative power which the Constitution bestows on
Congress and which is, by its nature, nondelegable.'s
In 1922, Congress responded once again by amending the words
of the "savings to suitors" clause of the Judiciary Act. In an effort
to address the plight of injured harbor workers, Congress added
the words: "and (saving) to claimants[,] for compensation for in-
jury to or death of persons other than the master or members of
cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it."'
Id at 215-16.
73. Id at 218.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v Caputo, 432 US 249, 257 (1977).
77. Caputo, 432 US at 257.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Act of October 6, 1717 ch 97, 40 Stat, amending Judicial Code § 24, subdivision 3
and § 256, subdivision 3.
81. 253 US 149 (1920).
82. Knickerbocker, 253 US at 166.
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the crew of a vessel[,] their rights and remedies under the work-
men's compensation law of any state, district, territory or posses-
sion of the United States, which rights and remedies[,I when con-
ferred by such law[,] shall be exclusive."83 Congress passed this
amendment with the belief that by restricting the benefits of state
compensation laws to local maritime workers through the exclusion
of masters and crews of vessels, the operation of the clause would
not interfere with the uniform operation of maritime law. " This
reasoning was not accepted by the Court, however, as the amend-
ment was declared unconstitutional in Washington v W.C. Dawson
& Co. 85 Again the Court called for uniformity in the application of
maritime law, stating that Congress' attemped delegation of power
by this amendment was unconstitutional."
In Dawson, however, the Court finally suggested a constitutional
alternative:
With doubt Congress has power to alter, amend, or revise the maritime
law by statutes of general application embodying its will and judgment.
This power, we think, would permit the enactment of a general employer's
liability law or general provision for compensating injured employees, but it
may not be delegated to the several states. The grant of admiralty and mar-
itime jurisdiction looks to uniformity: otherwise wide discretion is left to
Congress. 7
Three years later, Congress passed the Longshoremen and Har-
bor Workers Compensation Act.a" The original act provided that:
Sec. 3(a)3" Compensation shall be payable under this Act in respect of
disability or death of an employee, but only if the disability or death results
from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States
(including any dry dock) and if recovery for the disability or death through
workmen's compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by state
law... "
83. Mills Amendment, Act of June 10, 1922, ch 216, 42 Stat 634 (1922).
84. Jhirad, 1A Benedict § 3 (cited in note 4).
85. 264 US 219 (1924).
86. Dawson, 264 US at 222, 223.
87. Id at 227-28.
88. 44 Stat 1424 (1927), codified at 33 USC § 901-50 (1982 & Supp).
89. See 33 USC § 903(a).
90. The act continues:
No compensation shall be payable in respect of the disability or death of -
(1) A master or member of a crew of any vessel, nor any person engaged by the master
to load or unload or repair any vessel under eighteen tons net: or
(2) An officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof or of any state
or foreign government, or of any political subdivision thereof.
(b) No compensation shall be payable if the injury was occasioned solely by the intox-
ication of the employee or by the willful intention of the employee to injure or kill
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The constitutionality of this Act was soon affirmed by the Supreme
Court in Crowell v Benson."
The law which resulted from the above struggle between Con-
gress and the Supreme Court was not the only law in the area. As a
result of the 1917 Jensen decision,'2 a body of law developed which
expanded the seaward coverage of state worker's compensation
acts beyond the Jensen Line. By first looking to state wrongful
death statutes93 and then expanding to worker's compensation
statutes,4 the Supreme Court gradually developed a "maritime but
local doctrine." 9 "The Supreme Court reasoned that the uniform-
ity of maritime law was not prejudiced by applying state law to
maritime employment that was local in character" . . . The work
was considered local if it had no immediate relation to navigation
or commerce."'" The result of this expansion of state coverage
meant that in certain situations, the coverage of a state act did not
necessarily end at the Jensen line.
This "maritime but local" doctrine was an exception to the lim-
ited state coverage which resulted after the Jensen decision.' 8
When this doctrine was applied in conjunction with the LHWCA,
however, the result was confusion often resulting in injustice. 9 The
original words indicated that the LHWCA was intended to apply
himself or another.
33 USC § 903(a).
91. 285 US 22 (1932).
92. See notes 63-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of Jensen.
93. In the case of Western Fuel Co. v Garcia, 257 US 233 (1921), the United States
Supreme Court developed the "maritime but local doctrine" in connection with the applica-
tion of a state wrongful death statute. The Court held in this case that where the work
performed by an employee "is maritime and local in character and the specified modifica-
tion of or supplement to the rule applied in admiralty courts, when following the common
law, will not work material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime
law, nor interfere with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law. recovery could
be had under a state wrongful death statute. Garcia, 257 US at 242.
94. In Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v Rohde, 257 US 469 (1922), a workman em-
ployed generally as a carpenter by a shipbuilder was injured as a result of the employer's
negligence while working on an uncompleted ship resting in navigable waters. Grant, 257 US
at 473. The Court classified the employee's work as non-maritime in character and his activ-
ities at the time of injury had no direct relation to commerce or navigation, and, therefore,
held that the Oregon Workmen's Compensation Act did apply. Id at 477.
95. Garcia, 257 US at 242. In order for the state acts to apply, it must be shown that
the employment is non-maritime and is of such "local" character that the essential uniform-
ity and harmony of the maritime law will not be impaired. Jhirad, 1A Benedict § 6 (cited in
note 4).
96. Larson, 4 Workmen's Compensation § 89.22 at 16-217 (cited in note 55).
97. Id.
98. Jhirad, 1A Benedict § 6 (cited in note 4).
99. Id at § 8.
Duquesne Law Review
only to those situations not covered by a state worker's compensa-
tion act.'00 Whether an injured employee was covered under a state
worker's compensation act or under the LHWCA depended upon
whether his job was classified as of "local" or "national" impor-
tance.' 0 ' Many claimants, discovering only after trial that they had
filed under the wrong act, received no benefits, since their claims
under the correct act were barred by the applicable statute of
limitations. 02
The first part of the LHWCA also contained a provision requir-
ing that the injury occur upon the navigable waters of the United
States.10 3 Although such a test would seem to be straight forward,
this provision resulted in its own inequities. Two early Supreme
Court cases, T. Smith & Son, Inc. v Taylor0 " and Minnie v Port
Hensen Terminal Co.,108 illustrate this point.'"s In Taylor, a long-
shoreman standing on a dock was struck by a crane operated from
a vessel and knocked into the water. 107 The Court allowed compen-
sation under a state act because the impact occurred on land. 08
Seven years later in Minnie, a workman, who was standing aboard
a vessel, was knocked onto land by a land-based crane and denied
state compensation because the impact occurred over navigable
waters. 0 19 Thus, two employees who were performing identical
tasks could be compensated differently depending upon where they
were standing when the injury occurred."0 Theoretically, an em-
ployee walked into and out of the coverage of the different acts
throughout the work day.
After 15 years of interpretation under the conflicting state and
federal compensation systems, the Supreme Court, in 1942, at-
tempted to reconcile the inconsistencies through its holding in Da-
100. Id. The act states that recovery may be had only "if recovery for the disability or
death through workmen's compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by state
law . . . " 33 USC 903(a).
101. Jhirad, 1A Benedict § 8 (cited in note 4).
102. Id.
103. Section 3(a) of the LHWCA stated: "Compensation shall be payable ... only if
the disability or death occurs upon the navigable waters of the United States." This provi-
sion has been maintained in the current language of the LHWCA. 33 USC § 903(a). How-
ever, the current language now includes a number of adjoining areas. Id.
104. 276 US 179 (1928).
105. 295 US 647 (1935).
106. Larson, 4 Workmen's Compensation § 89.23(a) (cited in note 55).
107. Taylor, 276 US at 181.
108. Id at 181, 182.
109. Minnie, 295 US at 648, 649.
110. Larson, 4 Workmen's Compensation § 89.23(a) (cited in note 55).
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vis v Department of Labor and Industries."' In Davis, a steel
worker was dismantling a bridge across a navigable river and load-
ing these dismantled parts onto a barge when he fell into the river
and drowned.1 ' The worker's wife sought benefits under the state
workmen's compensation act.' The Supreme Court recognized
that:
Employees such as the decedent occupy that shadowy area within which at
some undefined and undeterminable point state laws can validly provide
compensation. This court has been unable to give any guiding, definite rule
to determine the extent of state power in advance of litigation, and has held
that the margins of state authority "must be determined in view of the sur-
rounding circumstances as cases arise."114
The Court recognized that state worker's compensation laws and
the LHWCA were intended to be mutually exclusive, but the Court
was unable to set forth a test to determine exactly when one act
rather than the other applied. The Court concluded:
There is, in the light of the cases referred to, clearly a twilight zone in which
the employees must have their rights determined case by case, and in which
particular facts and circumstances are vital elements.11
Thus, with the Davis decision, the Court did away with the
"maritime but local" test adopted in the pre-LHWCA years. The
Davis decision also served to blur the Jensen Line. Given a border-
line case and a presumption of coverage under either a state
worker's compensation act or the LHWCA, it followed that all bor-
derline cases were to be resolved in favor of coverage by the first
act under which a claimant applied. 16 Although the Court's inten-
tion was to reduce litigation, the end result was somewhat less ef-
fective."17 While the creation of a twilight zone removed the neces-
sity for penciling a fine line between state and federal coverage, "it
left the eventual task of drawing two lines - one on each side of the
shaded area of the twilight zone. '
Twenty years later, the Court once again expanded the coverage
of the LHWCA. In Colbeck v Travellers Insurance Co.," an em-
il1. 317 US 249 (1942).
112. Davia, 317 US at 251.
113. Id.
114. Id at 253.
115. Id at 256.
116. Larson, 4 Workmen's Compensation § 89.24 (cited in note 55).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. 370 US 114 (1962).
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ployee, injured while constructing a vessel, was permitted to re-
cover under the LHWCA12 0 even though construction work had
long been established as falling under state jurisdiction under the
"maritime but local" doctrine.2M The Court interpreted the Act to
cover all injuries occurring on navigable waters.1 22 The Court pro-
vided "if recovery. . . may not validly be provided by State law" a
very extensive interpretation.1 2 3 This opinion thus established the
shoreline as the sole boundary of the area covered under the
LHWCA.
The Court would not extend coverage of the LHWCA beyond
that provided in Calbeck, however, without congressional interven-
tion. In Nacirema Operating Co., Inc., v Johnson,12 4 one long-
shoremen died and two others were severely injured while unload-
ing cargo from a ship onto a railroad car stationed on the pier. 
25
The Court denied coverage under the LHWCA.12 The Court held
that the LHWCA covers injuries occurring "upon the navigable
waters," and furnishes a remedy only "if recovery . . .through
workmen's compensation proceedings may not validly be provided
by State law.' ' 127 The Nacirema Court reasoned that Congress was
given the opportunity to extend coverage to all longshoremen by
exercising its power over maritime matters.2 8 However, the lan-
guage of the LHWCA was to the contrary and the background of
the statute left little doubt that Congress' concern in providing
compensation was a narrow one.'29 Thus after Nacirema, although
it was clear that admiralty tort jurisdiction extended to ship-
caused injuries on a pier, the Court would not enlarge the coverage
of the LHWCA to encompass these areas. 30 The Supreme Court
once again opened the door for congressional intervention.
Forty-five years after the LHWCA was first passed, Congress
made an effort to amend the Act in 1972 to eliminate any de-
fects. '1 Congress attempted to provide a remedy for longshoremen
120. Colbeck, 370 US at 115.
121. Larson, 4 Workmen's Compensation § 89.25 (cited in note 55).
122. Colbeck, 370 US at 126 (emphasis added).
123. Jhirad, 1A Benedict §11 (cited in note 4).
124. 396 US 212 (1969).
125. Nacirema, 396 US at 213.
126. Id at 214, 223.
127. Id at 217.
128. Id at 215.
129. Id at 215, 216.
130. Id at 222.
131. The relevant portions of the 1972 amendments are section 2(3) from which the
courts created a status test and section 3(a) from which a situs test was derived. Section 2(3)
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and harbor workers and others in maritime employment in respect
to all injuries, whether occurring on navigable waters or on adjoin-
ing piers, wharfs and docks.132 Following the Supreme Court's sug-
gestion in Nacirema, Congress eliminated the language which re-
quired that a claimant not have an available remedy under state
law.
The 1972 amendments to the LHWCA lead to the creation of a
two-tier test."8 3 For an employee to receive benefits, the injury had
to occur within a "situs" covered by the LHWCA. 3 ' This test of
coverage consisted of the previous navigable-waters role expanded
into the additional areas of any drydock, wharf or pier.'15 New to
the LHWCA was a limitation on who was considered an employee
under the Act.' s6 Prior to the 1972 amendments, there was nothing
to limit the concept of "employee" in terms of the character of the
worker's activities.1 7 After 1972, an employee had to meet a statu-
tory definition of employee to be covered by the LHWCA.158 This
prong of the test became known as the "status" provision.
13 9
In making these changes, Congress attempted to clearly define
states:
The term "employee" means any person engaged in maritime employment, includ-
ing any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations, and any
harborworker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and shipbreaker, but such
term does not include a master or member of a crew of any vessel, or any person
engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel under eighteen
tons net
33 USC § 902(3).
Section 3(a) states:
Compensation shall be payable under this Act in respect of disability or death of an
employee, but only if the disability or death results from an injury occurring upon the
navigable waters of the United States (including any adjoining-pier, wharf, dry dock,
terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by
an employee in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel). No compensation
shall be payable in respect of the disability or death of -
(1) A master or member of a crew of any vessel, or any person engaged by the
master to load or unload or repair any small vessel under eighteen tons net; or
(2) An officer or employee of the United Sates or any agency thereof or of any
State or foreign government, or of any political subdivision thereof.
33 USC § 903(a).
132. Larson, 4 Workmen's Compensation § 89.27(b) (cited in note 55).
133. Larson, 4 Workmen's Compensation § 89.27 (cited in note 55).
134. Id. See note 131 for language of 1972 amendents.




139. Id. See note 131 for language of 1972 amendents.
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who would be covered under the LHWCA.1 40
[T]he likely rationale for disallowing certain types of employees from
LHWCA coverage is to lower the potential high cost employers in a mari-
time or maritime-related industry would otherwise be obligated to pay de-
spite the fact that these workers have adequate state workers' compensation
benefits, or other provisions for compensation (i.e., the Jones Act).' Since
it is presumed that these other types of compensation will amply cover
these designated workers, the mere incidental fact that their employer is
engaged in some sort of maritime activity should not be a means to open
new doors ... to longshore compensation. 4
The United States Supreme Court first reviewed the 1972
amendments in Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v Caputo. 14 The
Court addressed both the "situs" requirement and the new "sta-
tus" requirement as set forth in the 1972 amendments.14' North-
140. Jhirad, IA Benedict § 20 (cited in note 4).
141. See 46 USC § 688 (West 1986).
142. Jhirad, 1A Benedict § 20 (cited in note 4).
143. 432 US 249 (1977).
144. Caputo, 432 US at 265, 279. Between the passage of the 1972 amendments and
the Supreme Court's decision in Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v Caputo, a number of
Circuit Courts addressed the situs and status requirements of the 1972 amendments. Inter-
pretation of the situs test was offered by the Third Circuit in Sea-land Service, Inc. v Direc-
tor, Office of Workers Compensation Programs (Johns) 540 F2d 629 (3d Cir 1976), in which
the situs requirement was effectively read out of the act. Sea-Land Service, 540 F2d at 636.
The court took a more literal approach to the wording of section 903(a) in Stockman v John
T. Clark & Son of Boston, Inc. 539 F2d 264 (1st Cir 1976). The First Circuit rejected the
argument that Congress had intended to limit coverage to those areas adjoining the specific
vessel being unloaded. Stockman, 539 F2d at 276. In Stockman, the Court allowed recovery
under the LHWCA for an employee who was injured at a marine terminal located on the
water but over two miles from where the particular vessel was unloaded. Id at 266. In Jack-
sonville Shipyards, Inc. v Perdue 539 F2d 533 (5th Cir 1976), the Fifth Circuit denied cov-
erage to an employee injured while going to punch out at a management office located
within the terminal, but approximately one mile from the vessel on which the employee was
working. Jacksonville, 539 F2d at 541. The Court held that these facilities were not "cus-
tomarily used" for loading, unloading or for any other specific use nor did the areas adjoin
navigable waters, therefore this area did not meet the situs test. Id at 541-42. In ITO Corp.
of Baltimore v Benefit Review Board, 529 F2d 1080 (4th Cir 1976), the Fourth Circuit al-
lowed recovery when only part of the terminal in which the claimant was injured was cus-
tomarily used for "stripping" containers as they awaited ground transportation. Benefits,
529 F2d at 1082. The terminal areas were not connected geographically or functionally with
the ship's berthing area. Id. Although the exact point where the claimants' injury occurred
was not used for loading or unloading a ship, the Court concluded that since the terminal
adjoined navigable waters and was used for the overall process of loading or unloading a
vessel, the claimant was covered. Id at 1083-84. In Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v Dellavan-
tura, 544 F2d 35 (2d Cir 1976), the Second Circuit awarded compensation to a worker in-
jured while checking cargo being removed from a container at a pier not being used for
actual ship loading or unloading, but rather as a storage area. Pittston, 544 F2d at 41. Judge
Friendly speaking for the Court noted that any pier, wharf, drydock terminal, building, lane
or marine railroad meets the situs requirement if it adjoins navigable waters. Id at 52-4.
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east Marine was a consolidated appeal regarding two employees
who were injured in work-related accidents while performing ship-
loading duties.1"6 Employee Ralph Caputo was injured while load-
ing materials onto a truck which had recently been unloaded from
a ship.1 " The truck was parked within a terminal adjoining naviga-
ble waters.147 In employee Carmelo Blundo's case, however, the in-
juries occurred while checking a container resting on a pier.148 The
stevedoring company contested the coverage of the LHWCA by
claiming that Blundo did not meet the "situs" requirements. "'
The Court interpreted the 1972 amendments to Section 903(a)
as broadening the scope of landward coverage of the LHWCA.' e0
This opinion was confirmed in Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v Caputo.
A number of courts have also addressed the status requirement. The Fourth Circuit, in
ITO Corp. v Benefits Review Board, was one of the first to address the status test. The
majority announced a rule focusing on the "point of rest" of the cargo. Benefits, 529 F2d at
1081. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the LHWCA covered activities "between the ship
and the first storage or holding area on the pier, wharf, or terminal adjoining navigable
waters." Id at 1087. The doctrine also applied from the last storage or holding area on the
pier, wharf or terminal to the ship." Id. Judge Craven, dissenting in the Benefits decision,
rejected the point of rest theory. Id at 1089. In his view, cargo enters maritime commerce
when it is unloaded from a land carrier and is hauled by terminal employees working on
navigable waters. Id at 1092-93. Such cargo remains in maritime commerce until it is deliv-
ered to an inland carrier for further transportation. Id. Upon rehearing en banc, Judge Wid-
ner set forth his test which focuses on characterizing the status of the goods at the time of
injury rather than on any sort of geographical point. ITO Corp. of Baltimore v Benefits
Review Board, 542 F2d 903 (4th Cir 1976). Employees were covered only while loading or
unloading a ship. The Second Circuit announced in Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v Dellavan-
tura, that the status test applied to those who were engaged in stripping or stuffing contain-
ers or who were engaged in handling cargo up to the point when the consignor has actually
begun its movement from the pier. Pittston, 544 F2d at 56. In Stockman v John T. Clark &
Son, the First Circuit suggested that to be covered, the injured worker ought to be a bona
fide member of a class of employees whose members would for the most part have been
covered some of the time by the pre-1972 Act. Stockman, 539 F2d at 277. In Jacksonville
Shipyards, Inc. v Perdue, the Fifth Circuit adopted the most expansive view of coverage of
any appellate court. Larson, 4 Workmen's Compensation § 89.42(a) (cited in note 55). In
this case the court extended coverage to those employees injured while loading or unloading
vessels or while "directly involved" in such activities. Jacksonville, 539 F2d at 539-40. After
reviewing these prior decisions, the Supreme Court in Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v
Caputo adopted a test based on whether the task that was being performed was an "integral
part" of the unloading process at the time of injury. Caputo, 432 US at 271.
145. Northeast Marine, 432 US 249, 252-54. The two employees were Ralph Caputo
and Carmelo Blundo. Id.
146. Id at 255.
147. Id at 279.
148. Id at 253.
149. Id at 280.
150. Id at 279. The Court cites Congress' paranthetical inclusion of the lan-
guage--"including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine rail-
way, or other adjoining area customarily used by an employee in loading, unloading, repair-
ing or building a vessel" as evidence of the intention to broaden landward coverage of the
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The Court resolved the situation by interpreting the words "cus-
tomarily used" as sufficiently broad to include areas such as those
where the injuries occurred in the case at bar."' The Court stated
that it is not entirely clear that the phrase "customarily used" was
intended to modify more than the immediately preceding phrase
'other areas.""2 However, even if "customarily used" also modifies
the specified areas, "Blundo satisfies the test by working in an ad-
joining terminal facility . . . customarily used . . . for loading
[and] unloading."1 53 The terminal facility at which Caputo was in-
jured was customarily used for loading and unloading, thus he met
the situs requirements of the LHWCA."'5 The United States Su-
preme Court has not changed this test since Northeast Marine.
Both respondents in Northeast Marine satisfied the "status"
test of eligibility for compensation since they were both "engaged
in maritime employment" 5 and were therefore "employees"
within the meaning of section 902(3) at the time of their injuries."s5
In order to arrive at this conclusion, however, the Supreme Court
had to follow a new line of reasoning.
The congressional intent behind adopting the 1972 amendments
was to adapt the LHWCA to modern cargo-handling techniques,
such as containerization,"' which had moved much of the long-
shoremen's work off the vessel and onto land. 15 In response to this
modernization, the Court adopted a suitable test. The Court found
that Blundo, who was responsible for "checking" containers on the
pier, was employed in a position that was an "integral part of the
unloading process."'9 Blundo was, therefore, a statutory "em-
ployee" covered under the LHWCA. 60
LHWCA. 33 USC § 903(a).




155. Id at 264-65. According to the Court section 903(a) requires that an employee be
engaged in "maritime employment" in order to receive coverage. Id. The Court held that
both Caputo and Blundo fit the statutory definition of maritime employment in this case.
Id.
156. Id at 264-79.
157. Id at 270. Containerization is the process whereby break-bulk items of cargo are
stored in a larger container before being placed on a ship. Id. Containerization allows the
time-comsuming work of stowage an unstowage to be performed on land. Id. This process
differs from the traditional technique whereby each item of cargo was individually secured
in the ship. Id.
158. Id at 269.
159. Id at 271.
160. Id. Caputo was employed in traditional longshore work, thus, he also met the
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The Court held that by amending the LHWCA, Congress
wanted a system that did not depend on the fortuitous circum-
stances of whether the injury occurred on land or over water and
intended to provide continuous coverage to amphibious workers
who, without the amendments, would be covered for only part of
their work day."' The Court thus expanded coverage to include all
physical tasks performed on the waterfront, and particularly those
tasks necessary to transfer cargo between land and water transpor-
tation.' 62 This doctrine became known as the "amphibious workers
doctrine. 16 3 The Court held that as long as the task an employee
was performing at the time of his injury was an "integral part" of
the loading or unloading process, the employee was covered by the
LHWCA.'" Although the Court only addressed longshoremen in
Northeast Marine, the Court left open the possibility that a num-
ber of other employees were also covered under the LHWCA.
The Supreme Court affirmed the "integral part" of the loading
process test in the 1979 case of P.C. Pfeiffer Company, Inc. v
Ford.1 65 Like the Northeast Marine decision, Pfeiffer involved the
consolidated appeals of two workers. 16" Respondent Diverson Ford
injured his middle finger while working on a public dock in the
Port of Beaumont, Texas. 67 Ford was employed by petitioner, P.C.
Pfeiffer Co. to fasten military vehicles onto railroad flatcars which
had been delivered to the port by ship. 66 Respondent Will Bryant,
while working as a cotton header for petitioner Ayers Steamship
Co., was injured while unloading a bale of cotton from a hay wagon
into a pier warehouse.' 6 '
Both respondents were denied coverage under the LHWCA by
the administrative law judge' who applied the "point of rest"''
status provisions. Id at 273.
161. Id at 273.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id at 271.
165. 444 US 69 (1979).




170. Section 939 of the act grants the Secretary of Labor general powers to administer
the act. 33 USC § 939. This section also gives the Secretary the authority to "make such
rules and regulations... as may be necessary.. ." The act provides for a review of com-
pensation orders whereby disputes as to coverage are first determined by an administrative
law judge with a right of appeal to the Benefits Review Board. ITO Corp. of Baltimore v
Benefits Review Board, 529 F2d 1080 (4th Cir 1975). The Board is comprised of three mem-
bers who are appointed by the Secretary of Labor. Benefits, 529 F2d at 1092. The Board's
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doctrine. 7 12 The point of rest doctrine defined employment as in-
cluding only the portion of the unloading process that took place
before the stevedoring gang placed cargo onto the dock and the
portion of the loading process that took place to the seaside of the
last point of rest on the dock.
17 3
The Benefits Review Board reversed both decisions and the
court of appeals affirmed.17 4 The Supreme Court held that both
respondents were engaged in maritime employment at the time of
their injuries because they were engaged in the intermediate steps
of moving cargo between ship and land transportation.'
7
5
The petitioners argued that the LHWCA covered only workers
who were working, or who may be assigned to work, over the water
itself.' 76 The Supreme Court rejected this interpretation.17 7 The
Court explained that both men were engaged in the type of duties
that longshoremen perform in transporting goods between ship
and land transportation. 78 Under section 902(3), workers doing
tasks traditionally performed by longshoremen were within the
province of the LWHCA. 79 The crucial factor was the nature of
the actions to which a worker may be assigned.' s0 Persons moving
cargo directly from ship to land transportation were engaged in
maritime employment, and a worker responsible for some portion
of that activity was as much an integral part of the process as a
person who participated in the entire process.18'
Congress once again amended the LHWCA in 1984 when it ex-
panded upon sections 902(3) and 903(a). 82 These changes were in
accord with the status and situs tests developed by the Supreme
Court in intermediate decisions. Congress attempted to limit cov-
erage only to those employees who would not receive compensation
decision is reviewable by the court of appeals for the circuit where the injury occurred. Id.
See also, 33 USC §§ 921(b) and (c).
171. See note 122.
172. Pfeiffer, 444 US at 76.
173. Id at 75.
174. Id at 76.
175. Id at 74, 75.
176. Id at 77.
177. Id at 78.
178. Id at 75.
179. Id at 82.
180. Id.
181. Id at 82, 83. The Court in Schwalb interpreted this case as meaning that "work-
ers performing no more than one integral part of the loading or unloading process were
entitled to compensation." Schwalb, 110 S Ct at 385.




under another act, and in an attempt to clearly define who was
covered under the LHWCA, Congress passed amendments which
specifically excluded a group of people who were not intended to
be covered. 
1 3
When Congress amended the status provision in 1984, its pur-
pose was "to reaffirm the purposes of the 1972 jurisdictional
changes, and in that light. . . [to exclude) certain fairly identifi-
able employers"' " who, although working on a dock or pier, do not
have "a sufficient nexus to maritime navigation and commerce."1 8
The 1984 amendments specifically list a number of employees who
are excluded from coverage. This list includes: "individuals em-
ployed exclusively to perform office, clerical, secretarial, security,
or data processing work ... "
The Supreme Court of the United States last addressed the
question of the Act's coverage in the case of Herb's Welding, Inc. v
Gray.187 In Gray, a welder working on an offshore oil-dwelling rig
was injured when a pipeline exploded.18 8 Relying upon the 1972
amendments, the Court denied coverage to Gray.189 The Court
held that offshore drilling was not "maritime activity," nor did any
task essential thereto necessarily constitute "maritime employ-
ment" for purposes of the LHWCA.1' 0 The term maritime employ-
ment can not be read to eliminate any requirement of connection
with loading or unloading."' The "maritime employment" require-
ment was an occupational test focusing on loading and unload-
ing.19 2 The purpose of the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA was
to cover those workers on a covered situs who were involved in the
essential elements of the loading and unloading or the construction
of vessels. 93 The welding performed by Gray in this case was far
removed from traditional maritime employment as defined under
the LHWCA.I"
Given the statute's history, as well as the congressional intent
183. See note 28 for the language of 33 USC § 902(3).
184. Id.
185. S Rep No 81, 98th Cong, 1st Sess 25 (1983).
186. 33 USC § 902(3)(A).
187. 470 US 414 (1985).
188. Gray, 470 US at 416.
189. Id at 427.
190. Id at 422.
191. Id at 424.
192. Id at 425.
193. Id at 424.
194. Id at 425.
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behind the most recent amendments to the LHWCA, the decision
reached by today's Supreme Court in Chesapeake and Ohio Rail-
way Company v Schwalb is predictable. The LHWCA is a compen-
sation statute which was designed to provide coverage for those
employees who broadly engage in the process of loading and un-
loading a ship. When the LHWCA was first passed in 1927, much
of the loading and unloading work was performed by manual labor.
Over the years, this work has become increasingly automated.
Along with this increase in automation, however, has come an in-
crease in maintenance requirements. In order to keep the loading
process functioning, equipment must be regularly maintained. The
Court's extension of coverage to these employees is a logical refine-
ment of the definition of a maintenance worker.
When the Supreme Court of Virginia applied an "essential ele-
ments" test, that court held that the janitorial services performed
by the respondents in these cases were more similar to clerical
tasks than loading and unloading activities. This opinion was
clearly contrary to those federal circuit courts which had addressed
the issue. The United States Supreme Court decision in reversing
the Supreme Court of Virginia was legally sound.
The Schwalb decision falls squarely in line with those cases the
Supreme Court has addressed since the 1972 amendments. The
claimants in Northeast Marine'" and Pfeiffer'96 were engaged in
traditional tasks of moving cargo at the time of their injuries. The
issue resolved in those cases was when does the actual loading and
unloading process come to an end and cargo become part of land
based commerce, thus taking the employees out of the potential
coverage of the act. In Herb's Welding,197 the claiment was injured
while welding a pipe on an oil rig. Clearly this was a task far re-
moved from the traditional loading and unloading process. One can
only assume that if the injured employee in Herb's Wielding had
been involved with a task whereby he was wielding a pipe which
was used to load oil onto a tanker vessel, he would have been cov-
ered under the LHWCA. This, however, was not the factual situa-
tion presented. In the Scwalb case, the claimants, in keeping the
loading area free from spilled coal, were all involved in tasks which
were necessary to keep the loading process operational.
The Court's decision in Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Corn-
195. See note 143 and accompanying text.
196. See note 165 and accompanying text.
197. See note 187 and accompanying text.
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pany v Schwalb will not prove to be revolutionary. By looking at
the recent applications of the LHWCA, it appears that injured
workers are finally receiving the uniform coverage which the Su-
preme Court and Congress have for so long struggled to provide. It
also appears, however, that litigation over the issue of coverage will
not come to an end with this decision. The Court announced a four
point test to determine if coverage applies: first, the injury must
occur in the course of employment; second, an employer must have
employees who are engaged in martime employment; third, the in-
jury must occur upon a "situs" covered by the LHWCA; and fi-
nally, the injured employee must meet the "status" provision of
the LHWCA. In order to meet the last two elements of the above
test, a claimant should be prepared to show that his injury oc-
curred within a situs "customarily used" for loading, unloading, re-
pairing, constructing, or dismantling a vessel. The claimant must
also show that the job he was performing at the time of his injury
was an "integral part" of one of the above processes. Litigation will
likely continue for those workers involved in the fringes of the
loading process such as the injured employees in this case. How-
ever, the Court is no longer struggling to make the statute opera-
tional. The Court's efforts are now merely aimed at fine tuning the
statute to precisely detail the outer reaches of coverage.
Eric J. Zagrocki
1991

